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ARTICLE 
WOLF AND WILHELMINA: GIVING 
ENTERTAINERS A LICENSE TO BREACH 
THEIR CONTRACTS 
Mark Conrad * 
In recent years, high-priced entertainers and personalities 
have been the object of intense demand, resulting in lucrative 
personal services contracts. Such individuals - who have be-
come "hot property" in their various fields - have been in the 
enviable position of being courted and enticed by many prospec-
tive employers or managers. Sometimes, these entertainers will 
be lured by rivals and will breach their existing contracts to sign 
a more lucrative agreement. 1 
Two New York cases, Wolf v. American Broadcasting Com-
panies2 and Wilhelmina Models v. Abdulmajid,3 point out the 
problems that employers or managers face when their prize em-
ployees breach contractual obligations, and demonstrate the fail-
ure of conventional contract remedies to make these employers 
or managers "whole." Both cases involve well-known employees 
of major entertainment organizations, who breached their con-
tracts and jumped to competitor organizations, and both deci-
* Assistant Professor, Baruch College, City University of New York; B.A., City Col-
lege of New York, 1978; J.D., New York Law School, 1981; M.S., Columbia University, 
Graduate School of Journalism, 1982. Admitted to the New York and District of Colum-
bia Bars. 
1. See Motown Files $1 Million Law Suit Against Teena Marie, JET MAGAZINE, Aug. 
30, 1983, at 53; Gaff Sues Rod Stewart, Claiming Management Puberty Parts are Valid, 
Variety, May 19, 1982, at 111; Eddie Murphy Asks Court to Void Old Contract, JET 
MAGAZINE, June 3, 1985, at 38. 
2. 52 N.Y.2d 394, 420 N.E.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1981). 
3. 67 A.D.2d 853, 413 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1st Dept. 1979). 
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sions fail to grant effective breach of contract remedies against 
the employees. 
Parts I and II of this article will discuss the Wolf and Wil-
helmina cases. Part III will describe the equitable contract rem-
edies of specific performance and injunctions for breach of a per-
sonal services contract. Part IV will discuss a proposed new 
standard to permit the award of special damages that may pro-
vide a more effective remedy for future breaches of contract. 
I. WOLF v. AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES 
Since coming to New York in 1976, Warner Wolf has be-
come something of a fixture in local television news. Described 
as a "sports personality,"· Wolfs colorful delivery of the day's 
sports events with glib, cliched phrases!! has made him a very 
popular television personality. 
Wolf was employed by W ABC-TV from 1976 to 1980, when 
he joined WCBS-TV, a competitor station and a co-defendant in 
the case. Wolfs contract with WABC contained a "first negotia-
tions/first refusal" clause that required Wolf to enter into good-
faith negotiations and prohibited the sportscaster from negotiat-
ing "with any other person or company other than W ABC-TV or 
ABC"6 for a period of 45 days of a 90-day "renegotiation" period 
preceding the contract's expiration date of March 5, 1980. Also, 
the clause provided that if Wolf and ABC could not reach agree-
ment for an extension of the contract, Wolf was obligated not to 
accept employment as a sportscaster without first giving ABC an 
opportunity to employ him on substantially similar terms.7 Only 
if ABC failed to offer him a similar contract, was Wolf free to 
accept the other offer. 
4. See N.Y.Times, Schwartz, June 12, 1980, § III, at 19, col. 1. 
5. Wolf frequently cries "Let's go to the videotape" before narrating the highlights 
of a particular match. Also, he uses the term "swish" to describe a deft basketball shot 
and "boom" to describe a home run in a baseball game. 
6. See American Broadcasting Companies v. Wolf, 76 A.D.2d 162, 163-64, 430 
N.Y.S.2d 275, 277 (lst. Dept. 1980). WABC-TV is owned and operated by the American 
Broadcasting Companies (ABC) now a division of Capital Cities Braodcasting and 
WCBS-TV is owned and operated stations by CBS. 
7. 76 A.D.2d at 164, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 277. 
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Although Wolf was obligated by the terms of the contract 
not to negotiate with a rival employer during the first part of the 
renegotiation period, the sportscaster did just that. Unbe-
knownst to ABC, Wolf met with representatives of WCBS-TV 
on several occasions, some of the meetings taking place even 
before the 45-day exclusive period began.s Those meeting ulti-
mately resulted in Wolfs decision to resign from W ABC and ac-
cept an offer at the rival station. 
During that time, Wolf met with ABC officials, who on Feb-
ruary 1, 1980 reluctantly accepted the sportscaster's demand for 
a three year contract at an annual compensation of $400,000, 
$450,000, $500,000.9 Yet, Wolf refused to accept the offer be-
cause of ABC's delays in getting back to him and told ABC that 
his lawyer advised Wolf to "see what the other options are."lO 
On February 4th, Wolf agreed to the terms offered by CBS, 
which provided a two year contract at $400,000 and $450,000 per 
year. ll and which had an exclusivity clause that barred him from 
offering any renewal of the contract with ABC.12 Wolf did not 
tell ABC about his contractual arrangements with WCBS-TV. In 
fact, the arrangements were not disclosed until the action had 
8. According to the decision, Wolf met with WCBS-TV representatives on at least 
four occasions: October 4, 1979, October 16, 1979, February 1, 1980, and February 4, 
1980. During those meetings, employment possibilities with WCBS-TV were discussed 
and by the final meeting, contracts were presented. Also on February 4th, CBS and Wolf 
agreed to an irrevocable option letter providing that in return for $100 paid by Wolf 
"WCBS-TV agrees to hold open its offer of employment under the terms and conditions 
set forth in the attached draft agreement until June 4, 1980 and WCBS-TV shall not 
withdraw such offer prior to that date." [d. at 166,430 N.Y.S.2d at 278-279. 
9. [d. at 165, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 278. 
10. [d. 
11. Wolf actually agreed to two separate contracts, the first an 18-page sportscaster's 
agreement, and the second, an contract to produce sports specials (known as a "pro-
ducer's agreement") consisting primarily of sixteen half-hour football specials for an ini-
tial pay period of thirteen weeks followed by a two-year term. The salary of $400,000 for 
the first year and $450,000 for the second year, was to be divided equally between the 
two agreements. [d. at 162, 430 N.Y.S. at 278. 
12. The clause, which was in the producer's agreement, stated: 
"Artist's services shall be completely exclusive to CBS during 
the term of this Agreement, and during such term Artist will 
not perform services of any nature for, or permit the use of 
Artist's name, likeness, voice or endorsement by, any person, 
firm or corporation, or on Artist's own account, without Sta-
tion's prior approval, which approval shall not be unreasona-
bly withheld." 
Id. at 165, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 279 (emphasis added). 
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been commenced.13 Wolf accepted WCBS-TV's offer with one 
month still left in the 90-day renegotiation period. 
In subsequent meetings with ABC representatives, Wolf did 
not mention his commitment with WCBS-TV but advised his 
employer that he would not stay at the station, and that on June 
4, 1980, he was free to commence employment elsewhere. 1. Al-
though suspicious that Wolf might have made a deal in violation 
of the right of first negotiations/refusal clause, ABC, did not 
commence action until May 6th, by which time, Wolfs switch to 
WCBS-TV was a matter of public knowledge. Iii 
ABC sought injunctive relief barring Wolf from working at 
WCBS-TV and specific performance of the contract with ABC 
by a direction that Wolf submit CBS's offer of employment to 
ABC to be matched.16 ABC alleged that Wolf, induced by CBS, 
breached both the good-faith negotiation and first refusal provi-
sions of the contract. Strangely, ABC's claim failed to state any 
claim for damages, relying solely on equitable relief. 
The supreme court issued a preliminary injunction, prohib-
iting Wolf from work for WCBS-TV, but dismissed the action 
six days later.17 An expedited appeal to the Appellate Division 
ensued. 
In a 4-1 ruling, the Appellate Division concluded that al-
though Wolf breached the aforementioned provisions, equitable 
intervention was unwarranted. Although castigating Wolf for de-
liberately breaching his obligations to ABCls and CBS for induc-
13.Id. 
14. June 4th was the day after the first-refusal period ended. On February 22nd, 
Wolf and ABC made an agreement covering Wolfs employment for the 90-day first-
refusal period which ran until May 28th. Id. at 166, 430 N.Y.S. at 280. 
15.Id. 
16.Id. 
17. The preliminary injunction was issued on June 3, by Justice Burton Sherman. 
The complaint was dismissed on June 9. 
18. The court stated: 
At the time the February 4th agreements were executed, 30 
days remained in the 90-day good faith negotiation period 
provided in the 1978 ABC contract. By virtue of the all-inclu-
sive exclusivity provision contained in the CBS producer's 
contract, Wolf was contractuaIly precluded from accepting any 
ABC offer, no matter how attractive. Thus, by entering into 
the producer's contract, Wolf had deprived ABC of its right 
4
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ing the breach19, the court nevertheless ruled that ABC was not 
entitled to equitable relief. 
Citing the general rule that equity will not enforce specific 
performance for personal services contracts, the opinion noted 
that specific enforcement of ABC's right to match CBS's offer 
under the first refusal clause and ultimate award of the contract 
to ABC is "all the more impractical as a remedy in light of 
Wolfs stated reluctance to continue working for ABC."20 Uncon-
vinced that ABC did not have an adequate remedy at law for 
any damages suffered because of the breach,21 the court also re-
jected the request for injunctive relief, despite the fact that pre-
cedent existed for granting such relief if the personal serVIces 
are unique.22 
The opinion took pains to point out that the restrictive cov-
enant not to negotiate "was an integral part of the first refusal 
provision and is limited to a term of three months following ex-
piration of the contract ... Thus, even were restraint appropriate, 
under the 1978 contract to his good faith negotiations for the 
extension of that contract. 
76 A.D.2d at 169-70, 430 N.Y.S. at 282. 
19. The court stated: 
This record makes apparent that the producer's agreement 
was, in fact, one-half of a contrived bifurcation of the sports-
caster's agreement, already orally reached on February 1st, 
and that its all-inclusive exclusivity provision was the mecha-
nism utilized by CBS to obtain, prior to the expiration of 
ABC's right of first refusal and in avoidance of it, Wolrs com-
mitment to become the CBS sportscaster on June 4, 1980. 
Thus, CBS accomplished its goal of securing WoIrs sportscast-
ing services on February 4th without the necessity of having 
Wolf actually sign a sportscaster's agreement until ABC's 
right of first refusal had expired. By so arranging the February 
4, 1980 agreements, with knowledge of ABC's right of first re-
fusal, CBS induced Wolrs breach of his 1978 contract with 
ABC. (citations omitted). 
76 A.D.2d at 169, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 281. 
20. [d. at 171, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 283. 
21. The court stated that "no cogent reason is shown to break with precedent and to 
order an unwilling party to perform services of a personal nature, especially since we 
remain un convinced that ABC does not have an adequate remedy at law for any dam-
ages suffered as a result of Wolrs breach." [d. at 172, 430 N.Y.S. at 284. 
22. See King Records, Inc. v. Brown, 21 A.D.2d 593, 252 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1964); Harry 
Rogers Theatrical Enters., Inc. v. Comstock, 225 A.D. 34, 232 N.Y.S. 1 (1928); Shubert 
Theatrical Co. v. Gallagher, 206 A.D. 514, 201 N.Y.S. 577 (1923); Long Island Am. Ass'n. 
Football Club v. Manrodt, 23 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1940). 
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three months, and not the term of the CBS contract, would be 
the measure of the length of any restriction against Wolf work-
ing for a competitor."23 It further narrowed the importance of 
the clause by holding that "the first refusal clause was not a re-
strictive covenant in the true sense. Rather, it was a three month 
moratorium on Wolfs employment as a sportscaster ... and obvi-
ously intended as a bargaining tool by which to force Wolf into 
extending his contract with ABC."24 
The court also denied ABC's motion to remit claims for 
damages to the lower court for a hearing, since ABC failed to 
submit any proof on the issue.211 
The dissenting opinion26 argued that ABC should have been 
granted equitable relief. Since a clause in the agreement with 
CBS stated that Wolfs services were unique, the opinion con-
cluded that CBS could not seriously contest that Wolfs services 
were unique and ABC's monetary damages were difficult to 
prove. Addressing the issue of the scope of the negative covenant 
prohibiting Wolf from working for other television stations, the 
dissent held that the covenant "must be read into that contract 
if ABC's rights thereunder are to be effectively protected."27 
Ruling that the fact that Wolf accepted an offer prior to the ex-
piration of the contract effectively negated ABC's right to match 
the offer CBS made to Wolf, the dissent concluded that Wolf 
breached the contract and should be enjoined from competing 
against ABC for the two year period of the contractual offer.28 
The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals,29 which af-
firmed the Appellate Division's ruling in a even more sympa-
thetic light. Although it agreed that Wolf breached his obliga-
23. 76 A.D.2d at 171, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 285. 
24. [d. 
25. Since "the action was commenced before Wolf had ever performed a single sport-
scast for WCBS, and even before the expiration of the three-month first-refusal period, 
during which ABC would have been without his service had he elected to remain 'on the 
breach: " the opinion stated that it "seems fairly obvious that no thought was given to 
damages." [d. 
26. [d. at 172, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 286 (Murphy. J., dissenting). 
27. Paragraph 6. (a) stated: "Artist acknowledges that his services and the rights and 
privileges granted to CBS hereunder are unique; and CBS shall be entitled to injunctive 
and other equitable relief to prevent any breach of this Agreement by Artist." [d. 
28. [d. 
29. 52 N.Y.2d 394, 420 N.E.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1981). 
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tion to negotiate in good faith with ABC from December, 1979 
through March, 1980, the opinion stated that "there was no ba-
sis in the record for the Appellate Division's conclusion that 
Wolf violated the first refusal provision by entering into an oral 
contract with CBS on February 4th," since the breach occurred 
during the actual contract period30 and therefore his conduct 
"only violated the good-faith negotiation clause of the contract" 
[emphasis added]. 
After reiterating the prohibition against specific perform-
ance as a remedy for breaches of personal service contracts, the 
Court of Appeals discussed the claim for injunctive relief in 
some detail. Despite precedent permitting injunctive relief 
where "an employee either expressly or by clear implication 
agreed not to work elsewhere for the period of his contract,"31 
the court distinguished this case because the contract period al-
ready terminated, stating that public policy favors "robust and 
uninhibited competition."32 It added that "once the employment 
contract has terminated, equitable relief is potentially available 
only to prevent injury from unfair competition or similar tor-
tious behavior ... In the absence of such circumstances, the gen-
30. Jd. at 397, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85. In explaining its conclusion, the Court of 
Appeals stated: 
The first-refusal provision required Wolf, for a period of 90 
days after termination of the ABC agreement, either to refrain 
from accepting an offer of employment or to first submit the 
offer to ABC for its consideration. By its own terms, the right 
of first refusal did not apply to offers accepted by Wolf prior 
to the March 5 termination of the ABC employment contract. 
It is apparent, therefore, that Wolf could not have breached 
the right of first refusal by accepting an offer during the term 
of his employment with ABC. 
[d. at 400-01, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 485. 
31. Jd. at 398, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 486. 
32. The court explained its rationale by stating: 
Underlying the strict approach to enforcement of [anticompe-
titive) covenants is the notion that, once the term of an em-
ployment agreement has expired, the general public policy 
favoring robust and uninhibited competition should not give 
way merely because a particular employer wishes to insulate 
himself from competition (citations omitted) ... Important, 
too, are the "powerful considerations of public policy which 
militate against sanctioning the loss of a man's livelihood" (ci-
tations omitted). 
52 N.Y.2d at 399, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 487. 
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eral policy of unfettered competition should prevail."33 
In near-apocalyptic terms, the court stated that if equitable 
relief were granted for "a simple, albeit serious, breach of a gen-
eral contract negotiation clause," it would serve as the basis "for 
an open-ended restraint upon the employee's ability to earn a 
living should he ultimately choose not extend his 
employment. "34 
The dissenting opinion311 focused on the importance of the 
first refusal provision, interpreting it as an express conditional 
covenant under which Wolf could be restricted from appearing 
on the air other than for ABC for the 90-day post-termination 
period.36 Due to Wolfs breach, the opinion added, ABC was ef-
fectively denied the opportunity to exercise its rights. 
In rejecting the majority conclusion - that Wolf could not 
have breached the first refusal clause when he accepted the 
agreement with WCBS since the acceptance occurred during the 
term of the contract - the dissent called that approach "a class-
ical exaltation of form over substance [which] is hardly counte-
nanced by equity."37 Applying the first refusal clause backwards 
to the period of the ABC contract, the dissent concluded that a 
modification of the Appellate Division's order to include a 90-
day injunction would be warranted.38 
The failure of both the Appellate Division and the Court of 
Appeals to grant any equitable remedy against Wolfs breach of 
contract effectively left ABC without any remedy and gave a li-
cense for Wolf and other popular broadcasters to violate their 
obligations. Although ABC probably made a tactical mistake in 
not claiming damages, it is unlikely that traditional contract 
damage formulas would have made ABC "whole," since any 
damages, such as lost ratings, shown at the time ABC brought 
the action would be speculative. 
33.Id. 
34.Id. 
35. Id. at 400, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 488 (Fuchs berg, J.,dissenting). 
36.Id. 
37. Id. at 401, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 489. 
38.Id. 
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II. WILHELMINA MODELS v. IMAN ABDULMAJID 
The case of Wilhelmina Models v. Abdulmajid39 involves an 
even more flagrant breach by the employee. Iman Abdulmajid40 
is a well-known fashion model who has frequently graced the 
covers of many magazines. In 1975, she was "discovered" in her 
native Kenya by a professional photographer who sent pictures 
of Iman to plaintiff Wilhelmina Cooper, the president of the 
plaintiff modeling company. Iman, at Wilhelmina's urging, came 
to New York and signed a personal services contract on October 
27, 1975 designating Wilhelmina as the sole and exclusive per-
sonal and business manager for Iman for a period of three years. 
The contract had a clause acknowledging that Iman's services 
were "extraordinary and unique and there was no adequate rem-
edy at law for a breach of this agreement" and equitable reme-
dies would be proper in a breach or attempted breach,41 
Iman became a successful model, with earnings increasing 
threefold from 1976-1978.42 With ten months left in her con-
tract, Iman informed Wilhelmina that she was leaving the 
agency to go to Elite, a rival firm. Shortly thereafter, Iman ap-
peared in the listing of models represented by Elite, 
Wilhelmina brought an action seeking to enjoin Iman from 
working for Elite or any other agency. The lower court granted 
the requested relief, relying heavily on an earlier decision, King 
Records, Inc. v. Brown,43 in which a musical performer was en-
joined from recording for anyone other than the plaintiff, in part 
because he had signed a "uniqueness" clause similar to the one 
in Iman's agreement." 
However, the Appellate Division unanimously reversed in a 
39. 67 A.D.2d 853, 413 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1st Dept. 1979). 
40. Known professionally as and hereinafter referred to as "Iman." 
41. See Rudell, The Case of [man and a Mode/'s Agency, New York Law Journal, 
June 18, 1979, at 1, col. 1. 
42. She earned $32,000 in 1976, $72,000 in 1977 and over $100,000 in 1978. 
43.21 A.D.2d 593, 252 N.Y.S.2d 988 (18t Dept. 1964). This opinion will be discussed 
in greater detail in section III, infra. 
44. "The 1960 contract expressly provides Brown's services are unique and ex-
traordinary. The nature and extent of the recordings made by Brown under plaintiff's 
contract and the large quantity thereof publicly sold substantiate the contract character-
ization of Brown's services as unique and extraordinary." [d. at 595, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 990. 
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memorandum decision, concluding that the plaintiff had not 
shown irreparable injury, and strongly questioning whether 
Iman's services were unique. Stating that "the uniqueness of 
[Iman's] services would seem to be somewhat diluted by the fact 
that [Wilhelmina] required all models it manages to sign con-
tracts with such recitations,"·!! the opinion concluded by noting 
that: 
Insofar as defendant model's services are 'unique' 
in the sense that she looks like herself and not 
somebody else and is very popular, that unique-
ness is not vis-a-vis the plaintiff but vis-a-vis the 
photographers and commercial organizations who 
hire the model. Vis-a-vis [Wilhelmina], [Iman] is 
simply one of a number of models whom plaintiff 
manages, some of whom are in the same price 
category .... 46 
Distinguishing the case from King Records, Inc. u. Brown, the 
appellate division stated that Iman did not render services nor 
receive payment from Wilhelmina, but rather paid Wilhelmina 
as her agent.47 The court concluded irreparable harm could not 
be shown and that damages would appear to be an adequate 
remedy. 
The court in Wilhelmina sidestepped the question of 
whether the model's services were unique by stating that the 
uniqueness clause was in every contract made by the agency and 
that any notoriety and uniqueness was in large part due to the 
efforts of the photographers rather than the intrinsic beauty of 
the model. The decision also didn't address the circumstances 
that caused the apparently willful breach and the speculative 
nature of any damages. The court's lack of notice of Iman's tal-
ents - calling her one a number of models managed by Wilhel-
mina - would have made proving damages very difficult. 
In failing to grant equitable relief, Wolf and Wilhelmina 
serve to undermine the rights of aggrieved employers and man-
agers of entertainers and serve as a substantial attack on the 
sanctity of contracts. With little likelihood of equitable relief 
45. 67 A.D.2d at 853-54, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 23. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. 
10
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and the difficulty of proving damages, a license to breach such 
personal service contracts has been made. 
III. RECENT DECISIONS 
Since the aforementioned cases have been decided, more re-
cent opinions have tended to apply Wolf and Wilhelmina to 
general business contract problems, rather than in the entertain-
ment sphere.48 The only recent New York decision that tangen-
tially deals with the unique type of employee like Wolf and Wil-
helmina is Victor Temporary Services v. Slattery,49 a ruling 
that sidestepped the issue as to whether a high ranking em-
ployee of a "temporary employment agency" was unique and 
extraordinary. 
The defendant-employee in Slattery was the branch man-
ager of the agency's Rochester office for nine years. While so em-
ployed, the defendant had signed an agreement which prevented 
her from competing with her employer for a period of one year 
after she left her employment with the plaintiff. Four months 
after she ended her employment with the plaintiff employment 
agency, the defendant opened her own temporary employment 
48. See, e.g. Quandt's Wholesale Distribs. v. Giardino, 87 A.D.2d 684, 448 N.Y.S.2d 
809 (3d Dept. 1982), aft'd. 56 N.Y.2d 85, 452 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1982) (food salesman's re-
strictive covenant not to compete for a period of six months after termination in sales 
area held invalid since there was no evidence that employee's services were unique and 
extraordinary and no evidence that employee had access to trade secrets); McKay v. 
Communispond, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. N.Y. 1983) (former employee's three-year 
restrictive covenant not to pursue his career as an instructor in the business communica-
tions field held invalid, due to New York's antipathy towards such anticompetitive 
clauses; the decision also noted that the employee never signed any employment con-
tract); Scott Paper Co. v. Finnegan, 101 A.D.2d 787, 476 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1st Dept. 1984) 
(former employer failed to demonstrate that employee-manager in paper company was 
unique or extraordinary or privy to trade secrets and injunction preventing him from 
assuming comparable position with rival firm was improper); Alexander & Alexander 
Services v. Maloff, 105 A.D.2d 1066, 482 N.Y.S.2d 386 (4th Dept. 1984) ("[A) covenant 
not to compete must meet not only the foregoing criteria, but will be specifically enforce-
able only to the extent that it is necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests, 
is not harmful to the general public, and is not unreasonably burdensome to the em-
ployee" (citation omitted).); Kraft Agency, Inc. v. Delmonico, 110 A.D.2d 177, 494 
N.Y.S.2d 77 (4th Dept. 1985) (part of covenant not to compete against insurance agency 
within 50 miles for five-year period after sale of company held invalid as too broad); 
Wolff v. Wolff, 67 N.Y.2d 638, 490 N.E.2d 532, 499 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1986) (lower court 
abused its discretion in enjoining, with no limitation in time or geography, a shareholder 
in a close corporation from engaging in legitimate competition with that corporation). 
49. 105 A.D.2d 1115, 482 N.Y.S.2d 623 (4th Dept. 1984). 
11
Conrad: Contract Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987
180 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:169 
agency three blocks from the plaintiff and solicited business 
from those she previously dealt with while working for plain-
tiff. IIO After failing to comply with the plaintiff's notices to stop 
her activity, the plaintiff commenced an action for injunction 
relief. 
Citing Wolf, the Appellate Division ruled in a memorandum 
opinion that such covenants are disfavored by the court and 
modified a lower court ruling granting the relief. The appellate 
court ruled that questions of fact existed as to whether the em-
ployee was in fact "unique and extraordinary" and whether she 
had access to trade secrets. III 
A recent California decision, Motown Record Corp. v. 
Brockert,1I2 involved a fact situation not unlike that in Wilhel-
mina, but the bulk of the opinion dealt with the interpretation 
and legislative history of a state statute that limits injunctive 
relief. The case involved the singer Tina Marie Brockert,1I3 who 
signed exclusive personal services contracts with the plaintiff 
record company and music publisher. Each contract had a dura-
tion of one year, but granted the companies six options to renew 
for one year periods. During the contract period, "Teena Marie" 
became a very popular singer, achieving "Gold Record" status.1I4 
During the last option, Teena Marie informed the plaintiffs 
that she would no longer perform under the contracts and gave a 
written notice of rescission. Upon learning of her intention to 
perform for another company, the plaintiffs sought a prelimi-
nary injunction to prevent Teena Marie from performing such 
services until the expiration of her contract in 1983.1111 
California statutory law provides that a personal services 
contracts must pay a minimum compensation of $6,000 per year 
before a court can even consider imposing injunctive relief for a 
50. [d. at 1116, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 624. 
51. [d. 
52. 160 Cal. App. 3d 123, 207 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1984). 
53. Professionally known as "Teena Marie." 
54. She attained that position after her fourth and last album for Motown, "It Must 
Be Magic." The album sold over 400,000 copies. 
55. 160 Cal. App. 3d at 128, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 577. 
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breach.1i6 Each of the options agreed to by Teena Marie and the 
record company would pay the singer a minimum of $6,000 if 
exercised. The lower court, citing § 3423 of the California Civil 
Code, granted the requested relief. 
The appellate court ruled otherwise. In a unanimous opin-
ion, the court ruled that based on legislative history and statu-
tory interpretation, § 3423 only applied to contracts which guar-
antee the performance of a minimum of $6,000 per year, and not 
to an option of $6,000, which was merely "a potential" compen-
sation, rather than a guaranteed compensation.1i7 The decision 
also noted that applying the statutory provision to an option 
clause would defeat the legislative intent to "limit injunctive re-
lief to contracts where not only the services are special or unique 
but the performer herself is a person of distinction in her field at 
the time of entering the contract. "1i8 
The court concluded by noting that the record company did 
not make a contract with a "star," but with a "virtual un-
known." Due to that qualitative distinction, the court deter-
mined that damages would be the appropriate remedy.1i9 
Due to the courts' increasing reluctance to grant injunc-
tions, some new or expanded traditional remedies may be neces-
sary to rectify this problem. Some of these expanded remedies 
are: a greater use of restrictions on specific performance, the ex-
panded use of injunctions, or the more liberal use of special or 
punitive damages. 
56. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423, which states: 
An injunction cannot be granted: ... [tlo prevent the breach 
of a contract, other than a contract in writing for the rendition 
or furnishing of personal services from one to another where 
the minimum compensation for such services is at the rate of 
not less than $6,000 per annum and where the promised ser-
vices is of a special, unique, unusual extraordinary or intellec-
tual character, which gives it peculiar value, the loss of which 
cannot be reasonably or adequately compensated in damages 
in an action at law, the performance of which would not be 
specifically enforced. . . . 
57. 160 Cal. App. 3d at 135, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 582. 
58. [d. at 136, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 582. 
59. [d. at 138, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 584. 
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IV. PROPOSED REMEDIES 
A. EXPANSION OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
Specific performance, the forced performance of a contrac-
tual obligation,60 is granted by a court of equity when damages 
awards are impractical or inadequate.6} Specific performance is 
clearly an exceptional remedy.62 Although courts have displayed 
willingness to grant specific performance in contracts involving 
the sale of land,63 sale of antiques,6. patent rights,611 and long-
term output and requirements contracts,66 they are clearly un-
willing to impose this remedy for personal services contracts on 
the ground that specific performance would create an objection-
able form of slavery or personal servitude.67 
An element of uniqueness must be present in every contract 
involved in a specific performance case. Yet, in Wolf and 
60. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 16-2 (2d ed. 1977). 
61. [d. at § 16-1. 
62. 11 S. WILLISTON. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1338 (3d ed. 1968); 5 A. CORBIN. 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 993 (1964). 
63. Real property contracts, covenants running with the land and options to 
purchase land have traditionally been enforced by grants of specific performance. See 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Brennan, 385 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1967) (covenant running with the 
land); Abdallah v. Abdallah, 359 F.2d 170 (3rd Cir. 1966) (option to purchase real prop-
erty); McCullough v. Newton, 348 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1961) (sale of land). See also 
Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI L. REV. 351 (1978). 
64. Such contracts are specifically enforceable on the ground that the item has at-
tained a sentimental significance or value over and above its monetary value. See Pusey 
v. Pusey, 23 Eng. Rep. 465 (1684) (transfer of an ancient horn); Burr v. Bloomsburg, 101 
N.J. Eq. 615, 33 A. 962 (1927) (sale of a diamond ring); Falcke v. Gray, 62 Eng. Rep. 250 
(1859) (sale of two china jars). See Kronman, supra note 63, at 356, n.21. 
65. Patent & Licensing Corp. v. Olsen, 188 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1951) (employee or-
dered to assign patents on process developed while in the course of employment to 
employer). 
66. See Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975) (supply of gas 
to residential subdivisions); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948) 
(sale of carrots); Eastern Rolling Mill Co. v. Michlovitz, 157 Md. 51, 145 A. 378 (1929) 
(scrap iron). See also Kronman, supra note 63, at 356, n.25. 
67. The policy that equity will not award specific performance for contracts for per-
sonal services is said to be based on the difficulty of gauging proper performance, the 
American commitment to personal liberty, and the undesirability of forcing cooperation 
between the parties if confidence and loyalty have already been destroyed. See 5A A. 
CORBIN. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1204 at 400-01 (1964). The Thirteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution states: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist 
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." See also Sanquirino 
v. Benedetti, 1 Barb. 315 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dept. 1847); De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige Ch. 
264 (N.Y. Ch. 1833). 
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Wilhelmina, the respective courts were reluctant to call the de-
fendants "unique" to warrant specific performance and to ac-
knowledge that money damages would not be adequate. 
Some legal scholars have advocated the more liberal use of 
specific performance on the ground that it would be more effi-
cient economically than damage awards.68 Professor Linzer had 
advocated the adoption of a two-step test for determining 
whether specific performance should be decreed. First, a com-
parison of the efficiency of money damages with that of specific 
performance. If money damages is less efficacious than specific 
performance, the second tier would be applied, that is, whether 
specific performance would cause unusual hardships by enslave-
ment or by costs for society.69 
This test could possibly lead to the use of specific perform-
ance as a remedy for breaches of personal service contracts in at 
least a few, if not all situations. Looking at Wolf and Wilhel-
mina, the loss of Wolf by ABC and Iman by Wilhelmina pro-
duced damages that would be difficult to determine or specula-
tive under today's standards, such as lost ratings and lost 
bookings. Thus, the first leg of Professor Linzer's test would be 
met. As to the second tier, it may be possible that the society's 
interest in the sanctity of contract may outweigh the hardships 
caused by the employees who must perform. 
Still, it would be difficult and impractical even under this 
proposed standard to award specific performance against Wolf 
and Iman. Wolf claimed that he was dissatisfied with executives 
at ABC and refused to work there even after ABC accepted his 
salary demands. However, in Wilhelmina such relief may be 
somewhat more likely, since there was no evidence that Iman 
disliked her manager, but rather went to a rival for a more lucra-
tive contract. This Linzer formula could apply to other enter-
tainers who may decide to breach their obligations for more 
money, and not because they felt ill will towards their 
68. See Kronman, supra note 63; Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies -
Efficiency, Equity and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981). 
69. Linzer, supra note 68, at 131. Also, another reason why the courts are reluctant 
to impose specific performance to personal services and even most non-personal services 
contracts is the difficulty of supervision. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at 
§ 16-10. 
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employers. The moral justification to keep and adhere to 
promises made also forms an important consideration for the ex-
pansion of the remedy of specific performance.7o If, as in Wolf 
and Wilhelmina, individuals can breach contracts with little or 
no punishment, what incentive is there for others in our society 
to honor contractual obligations? In fact, the altering or renego-
tiating of contracts has become more prevalent in the last two 
decades.71 
Although it is admittedly unlikely that specific performance 
will become more suitable for personal services contracts, the ar-
guments of professor Linzer could apply: 
. The general use of specific performance could 
produce truer economic efficiency than the pre-
sent system, that counts the money cost of per-
formance to the promisor and not the emotional 
and other costs of nonperformance to the prom-
isee. Money damages lend themselves to the se-
lection valuation so often based by economists, 
discounting things that are important to some 
people but that do not easily translate into 
money. By holding the parties to their bargain, 
but permitting them to negotiate out, specific per-
formance lets no outsiders substitute their values 
for those of the parties.72 
With the prevailing attitudes in favor of individual rights73 
70. See Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 278 n.26 
(1979)(citing J. MACKIE, ETHICS 110-11, 116-18, 184-85 (1977)). 
71. This has been especially true in the area of sports. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 
1984, § 1, at 18, col. 5 (football player renegotiates contract with team after buying him-
self out of option held by New Jersey Generals football team of the United States Foot-
ball League); N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1985, § 1, at 42, col. 5 (baseball player wins ruling in 
breach of contract action against the Kansas City Royals. Blue to receive between $1 
million and $1.5 million); N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1985, § 5, at 1, col. 3 (Yankees fail to 
appease player Don Mattingly with two-year $1 million contract. Old contract renewed 
at $320,000 as Mattingly reacts bitterly). 
72. Linzer, supra note 68, at 138. 
73. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII and XIV. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states that: 
Every person, who, under color of any statute, regulation, or-
dinance, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be lia-
16
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and the generally limited use of specific performance, it does not 
seem likely that the doctrine of specific performance will be ex-
panded to be an effective remedy for entertainers' breach of per-
sonal service contracts. Also, due to the higher costs in terms of 
time and commitment, such a remedy would not be the best way 
to prevent wholesale breaches of such agreements. 
B. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Due to the traditional dislike of the use of specific perform-
ance for personal services contracts, the courts came up with the 
concept of a "negative injunction" to take effect during the con-
tract period, preventing the breaching party from performing 
the same contractual duties for anyone other the plaintiff for the 
remainder of the contract period.74 The negative injunction has 
traditionally been an effective remedy to prevent employees who 
have had access to trade secrets,n customer lists,76 and those 
who are "unique"77 from breaching their contracts. 
Injunctive relief against breaches by unique entertainers 
was first granted in the 19th Century English case of Lumley u. 
Wagner.78 Lumley involved a fact situation not unlike that in 
Wilhelmina. Johanna Wagner, a famous opera singer,79 con-
tracted to perform a specified number of times in a theater that 
the plaintiff had rented. The contract contained a promise not 
to perform for anyone else during the contract period, but the 
smger broke the promise and made a contract to perform for 
ble to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or 
other proceeding for redress. 
74. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at § 16-19; J. WEISHART & C. LOWELL, 
THE LAW OF SPORTS § 4.03 (1979). 
75. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at § 16-19. 
76. [d. See also Quandt's Wholesale Distribs. v. Giardino, 87 A.D.2d 684, 448 
N.Y.S.2d 809 (3d Dept. 1982), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 85, 452 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1982); Mixing 
Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 436 F.2d 1308 (3d Cir. 1971); Town & Country 
House & Home Servo V. Newbery, 3 N.Y.2d 554, 147 N.E.2d 724, 170 N.Y.S.2d 328 
(1958). 
77. Victor Temporary Servs. V. Slattery, 105 A.D.2d 1115, 482 N.Y.S.2d 623 (4th 
Dept. 1984); McKay v. Communis pond, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Purchas· 
ing Assocs., Inc. V. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 196 N.E.2d 245, 246 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1963). 
78. 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852). 
79. Johanna Wagner was the niece of the composer Richard Wagner and "was not an 
unknown member of a chorus line. She was one of Europe's best· known opera singers," 
called "the cantatrice of the Court of His Majesty the King of Prussia." See Motown 
Record Corp. v. Brockert, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 583. 
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another theater manager. The English court granted the 're-
quested injunctive relief. 
The Lumley rationale was accepted by American courts re-
sulting in the enjoining of newspaper columnists, athletes, ac-
tors, singers and other performers from working for new employ-
ers.80 In order for an injunction to be issued against a former 
employee, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) such relief is nec-
essary to avoid irreparable injury; (2) that no adequate remedy 
of law (damages) exists; and (3) a likelihood of success on the 
merits. 8 } The mere existence of competition by a former em-
ployee will not, in itself, support the issuance of an injunction.82 
New York's most important rationale of Lumley comes in 
the case of King Records Inc. v. Brown.83 King Records, cited 
and distinguished in Wolf,8. involved James Brown, a vocalist, 
musician and orchestra leader who breached an exclusive record-
ing and distribution agreement with plaintiff's record company 
when Brown signed a similar agreement with a record company 
80. See Harry Rogers Theatrical Enters. v. Comstock, 225 A.D. 34, 232 N.Y.S. 1 
(1928); Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Gallagher, 206 A.D. 514, 201 N.Y.S. 577 (1923); Long 
Island Am. Assoc'n. Football Club, Inc. v. Manrodt, 23 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Queens, 
1940); Harry Hastings Attractions v. Howard, 119 Misc. 326, 196 N.Y.S. 228 (1922); As-
sociated Newspapers v. Phillips, 294 F. 845 (2d Cir. 1923); Philadelphia Ball Club v. 
Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902); Skyland Broadcasting Corp. v. Hamby, 141 N.E.2d 
783 (Ct. Comm. Pleas, Ohio, 1957); Clooney v. WCPO TV Div. of Scripps-Howard B.C., 
35 Ohio App. 2d 124, 300 N.E.2d 256 (1973); Cullman Broadcasting Co. v. Bosley, 373 
So.2d 830 (Ala. 1979); Evening News Ass'n. v. Peterson, 477 F. Supp. 77 (D. D.C. 1979). 
81. 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 17 et. seq. See also Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 
U.S. 500 (1959); Quandt's Wholesale Distribs. Inc. v. Giardino, 87 A.D.2d 684, 444 
N.Y.S.2d 809 (3d Dept. 1982); Chicago Research and Trading v. New York Futures Exch. 
84 A.D.2d 413, 446 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1st Dept. 1982). Some courts have adopted a somewhat 
more flexible standard to determine if injunctive relief is warranted. See Wainwright 
Sec. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1971) (a plaintiff must estab-
lish: "irreparable injury, combined with either a probability of success on the merits, or a 
fair ground for litigation and a balance of the hardships in his favor."). 
82. Although many restrictive covenants contain clauses stating that the former em-
ployee admits that a breach of contract will produce "irreparable harm," no case has 
been found in which a court held such harm existed solely on such a clause. See Liddle & 
Gray, Proof of Damages for Breach of a Restrictive Covenant or Noncompetition Agree-
ment, 9 EMP. REL. L.J. 455, 471 n.2 (1983). 
83. 21 A.D.2d 593, 252 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1st Dept. 1964). 
84. On June 23, 1960, plaintiff and Brown entered into a written agreement whereby 
his "exclusive personal services in connection with the production of phonograph 
records" were engaged by King Records for the period of five years commencing July I, 
1960. Brown covenanted during the contract period not to make recordings for any other 
person. 252 N.Y.S.2d at 990. 
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organized by him and his manager about eighteen months before 
the expiration of the first contract. After concluding that the 
corporate defendants had knowledge of the earlier contract, the 
court granted an injunction restraining Brown from recording 
and restraining the other defendants from manufacturing, dis-
tributing or selling any recordings of Brown.8Ci 
In comparing the rationale of the court in King Records to 
that in Wolf and Wilhelmina, it is apparent how times have 
changed. In King Records, the court stated that "the nature and 
extent of the recordings made by Brown substantiate the charac-
terization of Brown's services as unique and extraordinary."86 It 
added that the fact that the defendant (Mercury Records) paid 
$27,000 to Brown's company to distribute the records "con-
firmed Mercury's appraisal of Brown's services as unique and 
extraordinary."87 In Wolf and Wilhelmina, the contracts also 
had clauses classifying the parties' services as unique and ex-
traordinary. Also, the facts clearly showed that competitors were 
willing to pay top dollar to those individuals in the hope of con-
vincing Wolf and Wilhelmina to sign new agreements. Yet, the 
respective courts gave little time or effort to ABC's claims that 
Wolfs services were unique and the court in Wilhelmina con-
cluded that her services were not unique at all. 
Another analogous case, Long Island American Association 
Football Club v. Manrodt,88 also demonstrates the differing ap-
proach as to what constitutes unique services. In Manrodt, the 
plaintiff football club sought an injunction to restrain the de-
fendants from playing for any other club. The defendants signed 
a contract to play with the plaintiff, but shortly afterward signed 
to play with a team in a rival league. In holding that the services 
were indeed unique, the court stated: 
Once a team is organized and the football season 
begins, it may be extremely difficult to find ade-
quate replacements for players about whom plays 
have been planned . . . by reason of the fact that 
85. [d. at 992. 
86. [d. at 990. 
87. [d. 
88. 23 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Queens, 1940). 
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after the start of the season, most of the desirable 
players have already been hired by other clubs.89 
Although the players in question did not claim to be "stars" 
or team leaders, the court ruled that their selection to the team 
in itself made their service unique. In Wilhelmina, the court 
stated that despite the fact that she was chosen by a prestigious 
model agency, she was still "one of a number of models whom 
plaintiff managed, some of whom are in the same price category 
as the defendant."9o 
California courts have also been very reluctant to impose in-
junctive relief, despite the fact that injunctions on personal ser-
vices contracts are governed by statute.91 This has held true 
even in cases involving such well-known entertainers as Redd 
FOXX.92 The only major exception to this trend is MeA Records 
v. Newton-John,93 where the popular singer Olivia Newton-John 
made an agreement where she was obligated to produce for the 
record company two albums a year with an option for additional 
albums in return for the payment of substantial royalties.9 • Re-
lying on the California Civil Code's injunction provision, the 
court upheld the injunction since Ms. Newton-John was an es-
tablished star with "unique and extraordinary" talents and had 
guaranteed compensation over $6,000 no matter if the record 
succeeded in the marketplace or not.91i 
89. [d. at 860. 
90. 67 A.D. 2d at 854, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 22-23. 
91. See KGB v. Giannaoulas, 104 Cal. App. 3d 844; 164 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1980). A 
radio station sued an ex-employee/mascot for breach of an employment contract, unfair 
competition and injunctive relief to stop a former employee from appearing in a chicken 
suit, the costume he had worn while appearing as the station's mascot. The defendant, 
popularly known as the "KGB Chicken," made post-employment appearances in a modi-
fied chicken costume. The court denied injunctive relief, claiming that such a restraint 
would impair the defendant's right to be engaged in gainful employment and would be 
fundamentally unfair. 
92. See Foxx v. Williams, 244 Cal. App. 2d 223, 52 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1966). Comedian 
Redd Foxx brought an action for an accounting against a recording company which was 
distributing his albums. The company sought an injunction to prevent Foxx from 
breaching the exclusivity clause of his contracts. The lower court granted the injunctive 
relief, but the appellate court reversed, ruling that since Foxx was not guaranteed at 
least $6,000, injunctive relief is barred under California Civil Code § 3423. 
93. 90 Cal. App. 3d 18, 153 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1979). 
94. MCA agreed to pay royalties and nonreturnable advance of $250,000 for each 
album recorded in the initial two-year period and $100,000 for each album recorded in 
the option years. [d. at 21. 
95. 90 Cal. App. 3d at 22, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 157. 
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The rationales of Wolf and Wilhelmina serve to make in-
junctive relief an even more limited, remedy than in the past. 
Since these cases were decided it would seem that proving "uni-
queness" would pose a greater burden for an employer or man-
ager and would effectively leave them without a remedy if an 
injunction would be denied. 
V. NEW FORMS OF DAMAGES - THE MOST EFFEC-
TIVE REMEDY 
Damages, the most common form of relief for aggrieved par-
ties, seeks to place that party in the same economic position he 
would have had if the contract had been performed.96 That basic 
premise derives from a philosophy, first espoused in the seminal 
case of Hadley u. Baxendale97 that a promisor is only liable for 
damages which "arise naturally" from a breach or that were in 
the contemplation of the parties at the time they made the con-
tract.98 The first prong is known as "general" damages and the 
second as "special" damages. 
The rule in Hadley focuses on the certainty or definiteness 
of damages, a concept that must be expanded in cases of the 
breach of high-powered personal services contracts. To prove 
certainty, a "higher caliber" of evidence must be required than 
is needed in other factual issues.99 The most practical kind of 
damages, lost profits, usually cannot be proven under this stan-
dard. Therefore, it has usually been held that lost profits caused 
by a breach of an entertainment contract are too speculative. loo 
With "star" entertainers, a relaxation of this rule would be 
most beneficial. An employer or manager may prefer to obtain 
such damages rather than an injunction, since, under injunctive 
96. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at § 14-4. See also D.C.C. § 1-106; 5 A. 
CORBIN, supra note 62, at § 992; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 62, at § 1338. 
97. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
98. Id. at 151. The rationale for this standard is to control large damage verdicts by 
juries, keeping the jury from placing too high a value on the promisee's "subjective" loss. 
See Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1365, 1391-92 n.134 (1982)(citing G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 126 n.122 
(1974». 
99. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at § 14-8. 
100. See Narragansett Amusement Co. v. Riverside Park Amusement Co., 260 Mass. 
265, 157 N.E. 532 (1927); Bernstein v. Meech, 130 N.Y. 354, 29 N.E. 255 (1891). 
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relief, no compensation is received for the loss and the organiza-
tion loses the services of the entertainer. A calculation of "lost 
ratings" or "lost bookings" would be easy to ascertain and an 
effective means of calculating damages. 
Though rare, some courts have granted such relief in the 
past. In Orbach u. Paramount Pictures Corp.,I°1 the court de-
cided that a theater was able to recover on the basis of proof of 
net profits prior and subsequent to the period of breach and of 
the profits of another theater in the same city. Yet other courts, 
on the same facts, ruled the other way.102 A relaxation of the 
"certainty" rule by the adoption and expansion of Orbach would 
bring "lost ratings" and "bookings" into the realm of lost profits. 
A. EXPANSION OF LOST PROFITS 
In the last fifteen years, several cases in the sports law field 
have discussed novel and intelligent ways to expand the notion 
of lost profits. Lemat Corp. u. Barry,103 the San Francisco War-
riors basketball team sought to recover lost ticket revenues as 
damages for the loss of star player Rick Barry.104 A lower court 
ruled that the team had been injured in the amount of $365,000, 
the difference between the gross receipts and a projected 
amount that would have been received had he participated. lOCI 
Although the appellate court denied the request, since injunctive 
relief was already granted, it did not specifically reject this 
method of calculating damages.106 
101. 233 Mass. 281, 123 N.E. 669 (1919). 
102. But cf. Broadway Photoplay Co. v. World Film Corp., 225 N.Y. 104, 121 N.E. 
756 (1919) which held that similar proof of damages were held to be too uncertain. See J. 
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 60, at § 14-8. 
103. 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969). 
104. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 265, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 243. Barry was sitting out a season 
after an injun~tion was granted to prevent him from going to another team. See also 
Whitehill, Enforceability of Professional Sports Contracts - What's the Harm in it?, 
35 Sw. L.J. 803 (1981). 
105. Id. The amount of the projected receipts was calculated by multiplying the 
immediately preceding year's gross receipts by the average percentage growth rate of 
receipts for the entire National Basketball Association during the year in question, less 
additional costs that would have been incurred had Barry played. The result was a 
$365,000 decline in revenues. See Whitehill, supra note 104, at 814-15. 
106. But the decision stated in dictum that damages were speculative and too uncer-
tain. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 678, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 246. 
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Other calculations of damages have also been argued,107 
such as loss of playoff participation rewards. lOS The inability to 
increase the price of tickets in the subsequent year has also been 
as a basis for determination of damages. l09 
A related concept is the question of whether "lost future 
royalties" can be recovered when a publishing or licensing agree-
ment is breached. Although such damages are generally regarded 
as too speculative because "the whim and fancy of the public 
determines sales upon which royalties are based,"llo the courts 
have accepted the possibility that such awards can be granted!ll 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in 
upholding a damage award, recognized that in some cases a 
jury's damage estimate cannot be achieved with scientific preci-
sion, and concluded that only a reasonable approximation of 
damages is necessary.112 
A great receptiveness to lost profits would serve as an effec-
tive remedy to cases like Wolf and Wilhelmina. Evidence such 
as a drop in ratings by W ABC or a gain in ratings by WCBS-TV 
after Wolf switched employers could be a standard of reference 
107. See Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. 78-243 (S.D. Texas, Oct. 10, 
1979). The Houston Rockets sought to recover business losses from the player's absence 
during one season and for losses incurred in the immediately succeeding year. The cur-
rent year's loss was calculated by subtracting the average per game walk-up sales re-
ceipts for games in which Tomjanovich did not play from the average per game receipts 
for games he did play and subtracting additional expense that would have been incurred 
if the attendance had been at the higher level. The resulting figure was the loss in net 
walk-up sales receipts. Whitehill claims that these calculations focused on the specific 
negative impact on the club and "approaches actual damages more closely" than in 
Lemat. Whitehill, supra note 104, at 816. 
108. [d. at 817. The team in Tomjanovich calculated lost playoff revenues by first 
determining that Tomjanovich's net scoring contribution was slightly more than five 
points per game and 15 games in the current season were lost by five points or less after 
the player's injury. If those games had been won, the Rockets would have qualified for 
the first round of the playoffs. 
109. Whitehill, supra note 104, at 817 n.131. 
110. See Freund v. Washington Square Press, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 379, 314 N.E.2d 419, 
357 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1974). 
111. In Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 
1977), the defendant, a producer and distributor of records withdrew a record by the 
plaintiff after it had achieved a modest amount of success. The court upheld a jury de-
termination awarding the plaintiff damages. 
112. [d. See also House, Good Faith Rejection and Specific Performance in Pub-
lishing Contracts: Safeguarding the Author's Reasonable Expectations, 51 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 95 (1984). 
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as could lost bookings by Wilhelmina and increased bookings by 
Elite after Iman changed agencies. 113 
B. THE GRANTING OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Punitive damages are granted to punish malicious or willful 
conduct.1l4 Used primarily in the tort field, the purpose of puni-
tive damages is to prevent the wrongdoer from similar conduct 
in the future and to deter others from engaging in the same con-
duct. In the area of contract law, punitive damages are not 
awarded except in cases where the breach is accompanied by an 
independent tort, llIi and where the breach involves the malicious 
or wanton violation of a fiduciary duty.1l8 
The use of punitive damages in cases of egregious conduct 
by a breaching party would be effective in deterring such willful 
breaches as in both Wolf and Wilhelmina. Expansion of puni-
113. In fact, a strong case can be made for such damages. Wolfs departure from 
W ABC and arrival at WCBS may have resulted in a significant change in ratings be-
tween the two stations. In February 1980, before Wolfs departure, WABC's 6 p.m. 
broadcast averaged a 12 rating and a 21 share (a rating signifies the percentage of all 
people watching and a share signifies the percentage of people watching who are watch-
ing television at that moment) and its 11 p.m. broadcast averaged a 14 rating and a 27 
share, leading all stations in both time slots. WCBS had a 9 rating and a 16 share at 6 
p.m. and a 10 rating and a 20 share at 11 p.m. WNBC (a third station surveyed) had a 7 
rating and a 13 share at 6 p.m. and a 9 rating and a 17 share at 11 p.m. By May, WABC 
had a 9 rating and a 20 share at 6 p.m. and a 13 rating and a 25 share at 11 p.m., still 
leading over WCBS, which had an 8 rating and an 18 share at 6 p.m. and a 10 rating and 
a 25 share at 11 p.m., and WNBC with a 7 rating and a 15 share at 6 p.m. and a 10 rating 
and a 20 share at 11 p.m. By July, one month after Wolf joined WCBS, WABC's lead 
narrowed, with an 8 rating and a 19 share at 6 p.m. and a 10 rating and a 21 share at 11 
p.m. over WCBS's 7 rating and 17 share at 6 p.m. and 10 rating and 20 share at 11 p.m. 
WNBC had a 7 rating and 17 share at 6 p.m. and a 9 rating and a 19 share at 11 p.m. By 
November 1980, almost six months after Wolf switched stations, the ratings showed 
WCBS a decisive leader with an 11 rating and a 19 share at 6 p.m. and a 13 rating and a 
25 share at 11 p.m. over WABC's 10 rating and 17 share at 6 p.m. and 9 rating and 18 
share. WNBC had a 9 rating and a 16 share at 6 p.m. and a 12 rating and a 24 share at 
11 p.m. W ABC lost a significant portion of its audience to WCBS and, to some extent 
WNBC during this period. Arbitron Ratings Service reports, 1980. 
114. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at § 14-3. 
115. See 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 62, at § 1340; Comment, Exemplary Damages 
in Contract Cases, 7 WILLAMETTE L.J. 137 (1971); Klingbiel v. Commercial Credit Corp., 
439 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1971) (breach of contract constitutes conversion); I.H.P. Corp. 
v. 210 Central Park South Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 329, 189 N.E.2d 812, 239 N.Y.S.2d 547 
(1963) (breach of lease constituted tort of forcible entry). 
116. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILI.O, supra note 60, at § 14-3. See also Brown v. Coates, 
253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958); International Bhd. of Boilermakers, etc. v. Brasswell' 388 
F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); Hoche Prods., S.A. v. Jayark 
Films Corp., 256 F.Supp. 291 (S.D. N.Y. 1966). 
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tive damages has been advocated117 and a three-pronged test has 
been proposed to determine if punitive damages are recoverable. 
A party must show that: (1) a valid contract was made; (2) there 
is an implied duty arising from the contract but distinct from 
the contractual obligations; and (3) the defendant committed a 
malicious or willful breach of the implied duty.lI8 
In employment agreements, some courts have recognized an 
independent duty of good faith and fair dealing. ll9 Wolfs ac-
tions in negotiating an agreement behind ABC's back during an 
exclusive period constituted at the very least, a violation of any 
duty of good faith and honest bargaining, concepts that are inte-
gral to society's preservation of the sanctity of agreements. The 
same could be said for Iman, who left Wilhelmina with ten 
months left in her contract with the agency, though not enough 
detail is known as to what precipitated her move to Elite. 
An explicit recognition by New York courts of good faith 
and fair dealing as implied duties would satisfy the second prong 
of the three-prong test. All that the aggrieved employer would 
have to show is whether the defendant committed a malicious or 
willful breach of the duty. 
C. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
Liquidated, or agreed, damages, is an attempt by the parties 
to a contract to provided their own damage remedies in case of a 
breach. Courts will uphold these damages when: (1) actual dam-
ages are difficult to calculate; and (2) where the amount stated is 
reasonable. 120 Usually, liquidated damages will be used as dam-
117. See P. Coleman, Punitiue Damages for Breach of Contract: A New Approach, 
11 STETSON L. REV. 251 (1982). 
118. [d. at 260-261. 
119. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) 
involved the termination of an employment contract. The court held that bad faith ter-
mination was a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As the court 
stated "parties in contracts and commercial transactions must act in good faith toward 
one another. Good faith and fair dealing between parties are pervasive requirements in 
our law; it can be said fairly, that parties to contracts or commercial transactions are 
bound by this standard." 364 N.E.2d at 1256. 
120. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 60, at § 14-31. See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1), which states: 
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the 
agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable in the 
25
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ages in a breach of restrictive covenant,121 but may be applicable 
in cases of breach of personal service contracts by well-known 
entertainers. 
As was earlier stated, actual damages in the traditional 
sense are hard to calculate for both Wolf and Wilhelmina and a 
liquidated damages clause pinpointing an amount of damages 
for breach may be a simple and direct method for determining 
damages. However, on a practical level, there is no guarantee 
that high-powered individuals will accept such clauses in their 
contracts and the amount of such damages may be more difficult 
for the parties to negotiate than for the courts to impose. 
Also, the intention of the parties is not dispositive if the 
courts interpret such liquidated damage clauses as penalties,122 
or if the amount stipulated is out of proportion to the probable 
damage.123 Due to the difficulties in getting entertainers to ac-
cept such a clause and the presumption that courts often use to 
strike liquidated damage clauses as penalties, such a remedy 
may be impractical and ineffective. 
D. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT 
In recent years, New York and California courts have held 
that a breach of contract can be actionable in tort, permitting 
the injured party relief that would not be available in an action 
founded in contract.124 New York courts have applied this con-
cept narrowly, ruling that the interference with the contract 
must be independently tortious or that the relationship dis-
rupted was legally binding.m California has expanded the con-
light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and 
the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably 
large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of pub-
lic policy as a penalty. 
See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907) (upholding a liquidated 
damages clause in a contract for the manufacture of gun carriages to the government for 
use in the Spanish-American war). See also Wise v. United States, 249 U.S.361 (1919); 
Sun Printing and Publishing v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642 (1902). 
121. See Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123 (1858). 
122. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 60, at § 14-31. 
123. Id .• See also 5 A CORBIN, supra note 62, at § 1058. 
124. See Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If at All, 
Should it Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 425 (1981). 
125. Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183,406 N.E.2d 
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cept to apply to "all advantageous relations, not merely those 
that have attained the dignity of an legally enforceable agree-
ment."126 More recently, California further expanded the con-
cept to protecting all areas of foreseeable harm.127 
As in the case of injunctive relief, the source of this doctrine 
comes from English law. The case of Lumley v. Gye,128 a com-
panion case to Lumley v. Wagner, concluded that interference 
with a commercial relationship can give rise to an action in 
tort.129 California adopted the Lumley approach in 1941, later 
than New York, but gave it a more liberal reading. l3O 
Tort protection against interference with contracts would be 
a strong deterrent against third parties, such as WCBS who seek 
to induce breaches of existing contractual obligations. Damage 
recovery would be expanded by the inclusion of punitive dam-
ages,l3l or mental suffering,132 and parties like WCBS with even 
deeper pockets than the high-priced employee or entertainer 
445, 428 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1980). In Guard-Life, the plaintiff entered into a five-year con-
tract with a manufacturer, providing that plaintiff would be the manufacturer's exclusive 
distributor in the United States and Canada. Later that year, the defendant, plaintiff's 
competitor, entered into negotiations with the manufacturer and ultimately, the manu-
facturer ended its relations with the plaintiff to make a formal agreement with the de-
fendant to supply defendant with the same materials it supplied plaintiff. After receiving 
lost profits from the manufacturer, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant 
for tortious interference with contract. The Court of Appeals ruled that a business com-
petitor is excused from liability for interfering with a contract when the interference is 
intended at least in part to advance its competing interests and the means employed are 
not wrongful. Also, the court ruled that the tort will not apply to a contract that is 
voidable or lacks mutuality. 
126. Danforth, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society's In-
terest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1491 
(1981). 
127.Id. 
128 .. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.1853). 
129. The court held that since the inducement by Gye to breach the contract was 
used for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff or benefiting the defendant, it was 
a malicious act and therefore actionable in tort. Danforth, supra note 126, at 1493. 
130. Id. at 1507. 
131. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 482 (1979); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 
1070 (1975); Trav~lers Ins. Co v. Montoya, 90 N.M. 556, 566 P.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1977); 
See also Diamond, supra note 124, at n.7 (citing Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 
Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978». 
132. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 
480 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 
(1967); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978). 
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could learn that negotiating with someone like Wolf during a 
"first negotiations/first refusal" period could do more harm than 
benefit. Also, managers like Elite, who may induce another man-
ager's client to break his contractual obligations would be liable 
for expanded damage liability. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Contractual relations are the backbone of a free market so-
ciety. Personal services contracts involving well-known and high-
powered employees have become more important in recent years 
as these individuals have gained influence and prestige in their 
respective trades. It is imperative to preserve the sanctity of 
these agreements, except in cases of fraud, duress or 
unconscionability. 
Unfortunately, the decisions in Wolf and Wilhelmina, in 
failing to grant injunctive relief, do just the opposite as the two 
courts permitted breaches of contractual obligations without any 
punishment. To rectify this problem, new approaches to expand 
damage remedies may be the best solution - not only for the 
aggrieved employers, but for society as well. 
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